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THE ETHICAL IMPORTANCE OF BEING HUMAN
GOD AND HUMANISM IN LEVINAS’S PHILOSOPHY
Pat J. Gehrke
The positioning of ethics as first philosophy, prior to ontology or epistemology, can appear to contradict Levinas’s insistence that the
other be another person, i.e., human. After all,
if the ethical relation is one that precedes being
or knowing, then on what basis might one
claim that such a relation can exist only among
or in a particular instantiation of beings,
namely human beings? Scholars interested in
environmental ethics and human-animal relations have grappled with this issue in Levinas’s
philosophy, but usually as a critical move that
would contradict or correct Levinas (e.g.,
Benso, Clark, Diehm). This is of little surprise
given that Levinas’s moral universe is both resolutely and exclusively human, leaving little
space for ethical relation to the nonhuman as
more than merely derivative of interhuman relations.
This is not to say that one cannot attempt to
recuperate an environmental ethic or an ethic
that might extend to relations with nonhuman
others from Levinas. Indeed, Levinas himself
will claim implications for relations with
nonhumans from his philosophy of ethics, but
such implications are, for him, always secondary reflections of the more primary relation between humans.
The focus of this essay is neither whether
Levinas’s philosophy is right or wrong about
its obsession with what is uniquely human, nor
whether the philosophy ought more properly
to take into account a primary ethical relationship with nonhuman others. This is neither an
environmentalist nor vegetarian ethical treatise. Instead, I am concerned with one simple
question: How does Levinas justify or substantiate the unique ethical status of the human
without returning to ontology?
My hypothesis regarding this question is
that Levinas’s distinct notion of God and his
insistence upon the unique status of the human
are the glue that holds together his ethical philosophy. The culmination of Levinas’s
thought, from this vantage point, is not merely
his statements on ethics and justice, but also

his unique refiguring of humanism. In order to
explore these issues, this essay begins with a
brief clarification of Levinas’s statements
about relations to nonhumans then works
through this distinction to clarify the concept
of the face and God in Levinas’s thought. Finally, I conclude with an exegesis of Levinas’s
unique position vis-à-vis humanism.
Non-Human Others
Silvia Benso, David Clark, and Christian
Diehm have each taken significant notice of
Levinas’s insistence on a fundamentally different ethical category for the human and the
nonhuman. Levinas himself has made this
point on a number of occasions, though not entirely without equivocation. Part of the controversy comes from his short description of the
experience of a stray dog wandering into the
prisoner of war camp where Levinas was held
(Difficult Freedom 152–53) and his subsequent discussions of the status of the face of a
dog and a snake (“Paradox of Morality” 169–
73). While Levinas does admit that “the ethical
extends to all living being” and that “one cannot entirely refuse the face of an animal,” he is
always quick to follow up these statements
with amendments that the “priority” or the
“prototype” for any ethical consideration of
the nonhuman must always first be human ethics (“Paradox” 169, 172). When asked directly
about the matter, Levinas put it thus: “The human face is completely different and only afterwards do we discover the face of an animal”
(“Paradox” 172). It was for this reason that
Levinas criticized the philosophy of Martin
Buber “not because he seems to be animistic in
his relation to nature; it is rather that he seems
too much the artiste in his relation to people”
(Proper 33). The issue is not whether we bear
some ethical responsibility for the nonhuman;
Levinas easily concludes that we do. The issue
is whether such responsibility is itself a direct
ethical relation or merely derivative of a more
unique ethical relation of the interhuman. For
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Levinas, the latter description appears more
fitting.
Part of the controversy also resides in the
lack of clarity to be found in either Levinas or
his commentators about why the human occupies this unique status. While Levinas claims
to be uncertain as to whether a snake has a face
(“Paradox” 172) and vacillates ambiguously
about the face of a dog and his ethical relation
to the dog in the prisoner of war camp, he is not
at all ambiguous about the uniqueness of the
status of the human or the importance of that
uniqueness to his thought. In the same interview in which he questions the ethical status of
a dog or a snake, Levinas states, “With the appearance of the human—and this is my entire
philosophy—there is something more important than my life and that is the life of the other”
(“Paradox” 172).
Diehm is particularly perturbed by the combined ambiguity about the ethical status of
nonhuman others and the unequivocal claims
to the unique ethical status of the human. The
problem is that Diehm can find little reason to
exclude a dog or a snake from the status of the
other in Levinas’s phenomenology. Diehm
notes that both are bodies subject to violence,
open to betrayal, vulnerable, weak, and exposed to violation. Thus, the nonhuman appears to fit the same kinds of phenomenal
descriptors that Levinas assigns to the experience of a human other, leading Diehm to conclude that “it becomes increasingly difficult to
hold any radical distinction between the
alterity of the human and that of the
other-than-human” (56).
Clark is similarly dissatisfied with the distinction and the reasons given for it. In the end,
he finds the distinction not only obviously anthropocentric but he accuses Levinas’s Dasein
of failing to be “neutrally indifferent to the biological” and “even sentimental in its
hierarchization of living creatures” (182).
Such a conclusion is a cutting indictment of
Levinas’s work, since one of the primary
themes of ethics as first philosophy is that the
ethical relationship “is a relation of kinship
outside of all biology” (Levinas, Otherwise
87).
Rather than attempt to correct or critique
Levinas for a failure or incongruity, if we take
Levinas at his word on these matters we may
gain a rather unique insight to the surprising

coherence of his statements on alterity, humanism, and God. To do so, let us quickly
dispose of a few possible but inaccurate explanations for Levinas’s insistence on human
uniqueness.
Perhaps one of the oldest and most common
distinctions made between the human and the
animal is the capacity for reason or its connection to rational order. This distinction is common in Western philosophy from Aristotle
through the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Clark notes a certain surprising similarity between Levinas’s comments about the dog
that wandered into the prisoner of war camp
and Immanuel Kant’s own arguments for the
ethical inadequacy of animals due to their failure to grasp logos (188–89). Even Levinas
seems to bolster such an analysis when he
writes that the human face “differs from an animal’s head in which a being, in its brutish
dumbness, is not yet in touch with itself” (Collected 55). However, to emphasize reasoning,
intelligence, or rationality as qualities that distinguish the human from the animal would, for
Levinas, be to mistake anthropological manifestations with phenomenal reasons. The distinction between animal and human is, and
must be, for Levinas first and foremost an ethical distinction. If we were to locate the origin
of the distinction in the faculties of reasoning
or even language, it would require that we
make these the esse of the human, the nature
and meaning of being human. In short, it
would be to once again place certain qualities
of being as the nature and meaning of being,
putting ontology back at the beginning again.
If we are to take Levinas seriously in his detailed and repeated arguments for ethics as first
philosophy, then we should take him at his
word that “intelligibility and rationality do not
belong by first right to being” (God 157). We
must seek another explanation for both the distinction and these comments about the “brutish dumbness” of the animal.
The explanation may be that the difference
is not one of rational intelligence, but ethical
awareness. Levinas claims that the being of animals is “a struggle for life without ethics”
(“Paradox” 172) and perhaps this is the status
of the animal as ethically less significant.
Diehm clarifies the matter by noting that the
animal world is quite precisely not the ethical
world of being for the other because animals
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are primarily concerned with their own being.
They are “beings for whom the fundamental
question surrounds their persistence of being”
(51). While this may indeed get at the difference in the ethical status of the human and the
animal in an abstract sense and it may even
have some impact on whether an animal can
experience an ethical relation with an other, it
is not entirely clear that any of this is relevant
to the question of whether an animal is an other
and whether I bear a direct responsibility for
the nonhuman other. This problem is compounded both by Levinas’s ambivalence about
the matter and the asymmetrical nature of ethics as first philosophy. In his account of the dog
that wandered into the prisoner of war camp,
Levinas describes an experience that for at
least a brief moment interrupted the inhumanity of the camp, reminding him that he was human. When the dog greeted him and his fellow
prisoners, he writes that “there was no doubt
that we were men” (Difficult 153). Levinas’s
own insistence on the brutish dumbness of the
dog and his explanation that the experience
was anthropomorphic seem posterior rationalizations for excluding the dog from the status
of an ethical other, even if the experience of the
dog appeared contrary. The asymmetrical nature of the ethical relationship makes it even
harder to exclude the dog from the status of the
other for whom I would be responsible. The
other’s responsibility, even the other’s capacity for responsibility, is just not important to
the question of my own responsibility. In
Levinasian terms, it does not concern me. Reciprocation is, as Diehm succinctly noted,
“simply put, moot” (52). So, even if ethical
awareness is lacking in animals, even if I can
never be the other to a dog, this does not seem,
de facto, to preclude a direct ethical responsibility for the nonhuman other.
However, there is still one matter to be considered in the possible distinction of the human and the nonhuman other: the capacity for
resistance to appropriation. This, I think, is the
beginning of the explanation, but not in itself
wholly sufficient. Recalling Levinas’s argument for the priority of the other in the ethical
relationship, we can begin with the infinity of
the alterity of the other that refuses to be appropriated or comprehended. The important distinction that may not yet be clear is that this resistance to appropriation is not, in Levinas, a

failure of the knowing subject’s ability to fully
grasp the things that it might observe. Contrary
to a simple epistemological skepticism, which
might argue that all observation of objects is
always by nature incomplete, Levinas notes a
specific type of resistance to appropriation
found uniquely in the human other:
An object, we know, is integrated into the identity of the same; the I makes of it its theme, and
then its property, its booty, its prey or its victim.
The exteriority of the infinite being is manifested in the absolute resistance which by its apparition, its epiphany, it opposes to all my powers. (Collected 55)

The reference to “the infinite being” might
harken us back to the infinite alterity of the
other in the ethical relation or it may push our
thinking forward toward an idea of God. The
ambiguity about the reference is itself a clarification, pointing us toward Levinas’s connection of the human other and the Infinite Other
that he will often signify by the term God. This
helps to move us to understand the unique ethical relation of the interhuman, connecting
what is most uniquely human with this exteriority of infinite being that might oppose all my
powers of integration and thematization.
While this clarifies the distinction, I think it
only begins to move our thinking toward answering our first question: How does Levinas
justify or substantiate the unique ethical status
of the human?
The Face
Since Levinas so often uses the face as the
entry point to ethical relations and the experience of ethics, it is reasonable that we might
seek some insight by clarifying what is meant
by the term. Both Diehm and Michael Hyde
have had some success at using Levinas’s concept of the face as an opening for explication
and examination of the broader ethical philosophy. Diehm makes an excellent case, referencing specific and direct passages from
Levinas, that “face” does not refer to the specific front of the head where the eyes, nose, and
mouth are located. Instead, Diehm argues, the
face can manifest throughout the human body,
in a hand, the shoulder, the whole of the sensible human being, or any sensible part thereof
(54–56). Starting from Diehm’s analysis we
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can find that Levinas may go even farther in
making the face more metaphor than physicality. In fact, while there is something of the
experience of the approach of the face of the
other, the face itself may not be a phenomenon
at all. We may have phenomenal experiences
of the approach of the face, but the face does
not appear, it has no appearance of its own, and
it would refuse to ever be made present (“Paradox” 171). Levinas makes clear that we do not
see the face and the face is not an object of
knowledge, the way any physical object or
element of the body might be seen or taken into
our consciousness (“Paradox” 176).
In addition, the face does not refer to a social phenomena, personality, or other
non-physical particularity of a person’s individual character. Hyde clearly articulates the
sharp difference between the idea of “face” as
a sociological or anthropological concept, in
which it might be equivalent to a notion such as
a role or a mask, and the face for Levinas,
which must come “before it subscribes to socially circumscribed rituals of self-preservation” (82). What Levinas refers to as the face is
not adorned by convention, clothed in
sociality, or even capable of being connected
or contained in a social order. It is, as Hyde
would call it, naked, or in Levinas’s terms, “extreme immediate exposure, total nudity” (God
138).
Starting from these negative definitions is
not merely a strategy to avoid common misinterpretations that later cause problems for
commentators on Levinas, but it also hints at
one of the most significant problems of reading and studying Levinas: what we are after
when we try to describe the face, ethics, or
even God, on the basis of Levinas’s writings,
are not phenomena that can be contained with
words or even thought. When we say that the
face is this or is that, we say not so much what
the qualities are that make up the face—we
cannot speak of what the face looks like or the
substance of its being—but rather, in
Levinasian terms, we end up speaking of how
the face moves, the effects it might have, and
the experience of being confronted or called by
it. In short, the face “is” only if “is” can be
stripped of all its ontological meaning as a being that can be made present. This does not
mean that the face “is not.” The face is neither
simply negated nor absent, it is not caught in

either being or not-being. In the same breath,
Levinas can say that “there is no evidence with
regards to the face” and yet say that there is “an
order, in the sense that the face is a commanded
value” (“Paradox” 176–77). Whenever
Levinas describes what the face “is” it is always described in terms of what the face communicates, the way the face opens one up, calls
one out of oneself. The face, thus, is not an object of knowledge, it is not a thing that is seen
or felt or can be erased, but it is an authority, a
value, a calling, a nudity, a weakness, and a
commanding that is outside of being and
not-being and cannot be contained in either
language or thought.
If the face is commanded value and authority, then what is that value or command? While
at times Levinas can be understandably coy
about the answer, at least once he was quite direct: “It is believing that love without reward is
valuable” (“Paradox” 177). Love, as in the being-for-the-other that is the basis of the ethics,
without reward, as in without even a hope or
desire for reciprocation or result. It is a belief
that love is valuable, regardless of whether that
love can have any effect, produce any result, or
even be returned. This truly unconditional love
for the other is the command and authority that
includes the simple “Thou shall not kill” but
also commands an affirmative obligation of
owing everything to the other. However, as
command and authority Levinas is quite careful to distinguish the face from force or power.
The face is all weakness and nudity in its supreme authority, an authority without force,
that can require nothing even while it calls out
for everything that I have to be owed to the
other (“Paradox” 169; Alterity 105).
With all this said, we may have only a
gleaning, an inclination, or a trace of what we
might want to refer to when we say “the face.”
Ultimately, the face must escape our cognition
and understanding, as it exceeds the simplicity
of the “is” that would seek to make of it a
theme or a visage or a simple metaphor. The
face shares this status with the infinite and with
alterity as ultimately unthinkable and unknowable, even if it commands me with all the ethical authority possible to owe everything I am
to the other, to be for the other. This is not an
accidental similarity but points toward the fundamental importance of the infinite and the Infinite Other, the Infinitely Alterior, that circu-
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lates throughout every last page of Levinas’s
writings, be they philosophical argument or
Talmudic inquiry: God.
I choose to introduce God into this study at
this point because the face is a common entry
point for God in Levinas’s philosophical
works. Levinas was never hesitant to note certain similarities between his notion of God and
his notion of the face, noting the similarity between “the face of the other, the trace of Infinity, or the Word of God” as being something
other than being, representation, theme, or object of any field of knowledge (Alterity 169).
Hyde notes this tendency when he writes that
the face “is how God, at least indirectly, show’s
God’s face: by way of the face of the other”
(94). This is not a mere similarity in description or a simple commonality in thought or
even just different ways to reach a similar
point. Instead, for Levinas, the face of the
other, the Infinite, and the Word of God are the
same commanding authority, the same weakness and nudity that can call of me to give everything I have, to offer my very being to be for
the other. As Levinas put it, “there is, in the
face, the supreme authority that commands,
and I always say it is the word of God. The face
is the locus of the word of God” (Alterity 104).
God
While perhaps clarifying the ethical relationship between humans, the question of the
face has not, however, given us a direct insight
to Levinas’s insistence on an ethical distinction between the human and the non-human,
nor has it yet provided a complete reason for
the prioritization of the human that is outside
of biology, genus, or logos. If the ethical relation is primarily only in the interhuman and the
locus of the supreme authority that commands,
i.e., the word of God, is in the face, then there
must be something uniquely human about
Levinas’s notion of the face or there must be
something about the face that limits its appearance to being first found in the human. Such
explanation would be salient to answering our
question here, especially if it could help to explain the apparently different degrees of ambivalence about the status of the dog and the
snake. Perhaps, though, this entry through the
face that leads us to the word of God can better

explain the status of the human in Levinas if
we can ask what God is to Levinas.
There is some contestation over the role that
God and religious thought more generally play
in Levinas’s philosophical writing. While
commentators generally distinguish between
his Talmudic commentary and his philosophic
works, it is impossible to read both and not notice the significant similarities in the propositions and conclusions. Levinas himself claims
that there is “a very radical distinction” between the two bodies of work, but at the very
same time also acknowledges that “there is
certainly a relationship between them” (“Paradox” 173–74). The radical distinction, however, is not in his statements about the nature or
status of ethics. Indeed, he is relatively consistent, even in his ambivalences, between the
two bodies of work. The primary difference is
in the types of evidence used to support his
analyses. Levinas himself isolated this as a
critical difference: “I would never, for example, introduce a Talmudic or biblical verse into
one of my philosophical texts to try to prove or
justify a phenomenological argument” (“Ethics” 54). The difference to be found is one of
articulation and evidence, but not of actual argument or philosophy. On his own terms,
Levinas recognizes that his “ethical reading of
the interhuman” has been influenced by his
Biblical thought, even if the Western tradition
“has largely determined its philosophical expressions in language” (“Ethics” 57). Regardless of whether one reads his Talmudic readings and Biblical commentaries or one read his
philosophical analyses and arguments, one
gets essentially the same position vis-à-vis
ethics, alterity, the human, and God. The Infinite will appear in both sets of texts and will
make that appearance in much the same way
whether it was teased from a criticism of Buber
or a passage of the Talmud.
The relation between ethics and religion is
thus difficult to determine in some of Levinas’s
work. While he sometimes prioritizes the ethical, saying that “belief presupposes ethics as
that disruption of our being-in-the-world
which opens us to the other,” he also contends
that the ethical call of conscience “remains an
essentially religious vocation” (“Ethics” 59,
61). It is too simplistic to take these statements
as contradictions. Instead, what Levinas begins to show us is that religion is ethics and eth-
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ics is religion. This does not mean that religious doctrine, dogma, or even religious
documents and exegesis must guide our ethics.
Such a position both would mistake our understanding and knowledge of religion for the
word of God and would also make ethics derivative from a divine that could have the will or
substance to give ethics a resultant form. The
invocation of God and religion is neither a
diminution of nor a caveat to the principle of
ethics as first philosophy. But this can become
clear only if we give significant attention to
Levinas’s understanding of God.
The study of Levinas’s notion of God is not
a detour that detracts from our focus on the
unique status of the human but, like the face, is
an entry point to another level of analysis and
understanding of Levinas’s philosophy. Even
if we restrict ourselves to his more predominantly philosophical texts, we find God plays a
central role in not only the articulation of the
face and ethics, but also Levinas’s own understanding of the exigency that drives his work.
Traditional Judeo-Christian religions have often conceptualized God through an ontology,
making God into a particular being with will
and consciousness. As Levinas writes,
“onto-theo-logy consists in thinking God as a
being and in thinking being on the basis of this
superior or Supreme being” (God 160).
Levinas desires to put ethics, and God, prior to
ontology and thus must find a way to articulate
a God that is not ontotheological but ethical, a
God that is not already embroiled in the status
of being and not-being or in questions of the
nature of being. Time and again in his philosophical works Levinas insists on the importance of thinking about God “without the help
of ontology” and “not in the ontological perspective of being-there or Supreme Being and
Creator” (God 153, “Ethics” 56). From this
p e r s p e c t ive , G o d i s a s mu c h a
phenomenological question for Levinas as a
theological one. God is not “the unconditional
foundation of the world and cosmology” that
might give to being order and meaning or that
might explain to me the cause and purpose of
the other (Alterity 96). God is not an object of
knowledge nor is God an interlocutor in a dialogue, but is outside of presence, absence, being, appearance, and thematization (God 224).
God “is” or, perhaps today we have to write,
God is “other than Being” (“Ethics” 61).

Again, we find that we are given a definition
largely through the negative, as with the face,
and the reason is much the same, for God and
the face are not disconnected. God is not the
model for the face of the other, for the face is
without model, but God is the ultimate Other,
the Infinitely Other “with an alterity prior to
the alterity of the other person, prior to the ethical compulsion to the neighbor” (God 224).
God is the Infinite, which is always already
distanced “in the guise of the third person,” appearing in every moment of the approach of the
face of the human other, appearing in every
calling of the neighbor, but always prior and
third (God 207). God, then, is the obligation
and fraternity of otherness that calls for my
first obligation, before even my obligation to
this face before me now, even if it is only the
human face that testifies to the alterity of God
(Difficult 295).
Here is the emergence of the substantive explanation for why the distinctness of the human from the animal is not ontological but ethical: God is the absolutely Other, the infinitely
Other-to-all-others, which refuses every attempt at appropriation and thematization with
a resistance that is absolute and undeniable.
The absolute otherness of God is the undeniable rupture that would rip consciousness out
of the for-itself and command it to be for the
other, in the most absolute authority and yet
with no force or power. The interhuman is
privileged because it is only the intelligible experience of the face of the other person that can
“cut through and perforates the totality of presence and points towards the absolutely Other”
(“Ethics” 57). It is not that the human has some
innate or even inchoate capacity or quality that
makes the ethical uniquely interhuman, but because God can come only to the human and
only in the other human can a trance of Infinite
Otherness shatter being-for-itself. As Levinas
put it, “The idea of God comes only to man”
(Outside 118).
This will not, I know, be a wholly satisfactory answer to many philosophers who will
still ask why the idea of God comes only to
man, why animals are excluded from being
able to invoke the trace of the face of the Infinite Other. Rightly we have not yet even gone
far enough to satisfy our original question of
how Levinas justifies or substantiates the
unique ethical status of the human, though we

GOD AND HUMANISM
© Depaul University 2006

433

have now found and assembled two important
pieces of the puzzle. What we must finally do
is to deal directly with Levinas’s own statements about the human and his complicated
relationship with humanism.
The Human
The relationship between Levinas and humanism is easily and most often viewed as one
of direct opposition. Many contemporary
scholars of ethics who have turned toward
Levinas find him attractive precisely because
he seems to repudiate so much of humanism.
Peter Atterton notes that Levinas’s denunciation of humanism is especially powerful because it is not merely a claim that humanism
gets it wrong in ascribing an essential ontology
to the human, but because humanism is denounced as an ethical failing (496). Atterton is
astute, however, is noting that Levinas “does
not repudiate humanism wholesale” (495).
What, then, is the relationship between
Levinas and humanism? If the idea of God comes only to man, then is that not something
that is uniquely human and substantively important to ethics and being? Levinas’s insistence on the ethical priority of the human and
the uniqueness of the human in relation to God
may be why some contemporary scholars prefer to say that Levinas seeks to create a radically different foundation for humanism that
finds its grounds outside of traditional
metaphysics of being (Simmons 104).
There is no doubt that Levinas takes sharp
aim at humanism on more than one occasion.
In Difficult Freedom he characterizes humanism in a way quite similar to Martin
Heidegger’s now-classic definition and also
quite antithetical to Levinas’s articulation of
ethics: “In a wide sense, humanism signified
the recognition of an invariable essence named
‘Man,’ the affirmation of his central place in
the economy of the Real and of his value which
engendered all values” (277). In particular, the
insistence on “an invariable essence named
‘Man’” seems quite at odds with Levinas’s
claim that ethics precedes all genus or species
(e.g., Totality 39).
However, the characterization of Levinas as
an antithesis or even a wholesale repudiation
of all humanism is too simplistic. There is, for
Levinas, a notion of the human that precedes

genus, species, and ontology. In Otherwise
than Being Levinas notes that “fraternity precedes the commonness of a genus” (159).
Here, he lays the foundation for thinking the
human as fraternity, separated and bound in a
fraternity of alterity before there is any organizing principle, idea, or shared quality that
would create the species or the genus. There is,
then, a very peculiar type of humanism at work
here in which the human as a distinctly different type of fraternity, by virtue of its unique relation to God, is cut through with responsibility before even the idea of being enters the
picture.
Thus, Levinas can in one breath condemn
humanism for conceiving of man as “a genus
or a being situated in an ontological region,
persevering in being like all other substances”
and also chastise anti-humanism for “not finding in man, lost in history and the order of
things, the trace of this responsibility which
makes subjectivity and, in the other person, the
trace of this value” (“Contemporary Criticism” 186–87). This, Levinas notes, is the failure of anti-humanism to find “the trace of this
pre-historic an-archic saying” for man (Humanism 57). Thus, it is across the whole of his
philosophy and not merely in Levinas’s Talmudic readings that he can at once work contrary to the notions of what he calls “the humanism of the Renaissance man” and at the
same time strive to recover a humanity “whose
spirit is inspiration and prophecy” (Levinas,
New Talmudic 76–77). This is a humanism of
the Other, a humanism that finds its basis all in
ethics as first philosophy and God (interchangeable concepts in much of Levinas’s
work) and why Jacques Derrida had clung to
Levinas’s own classification of the thought as a
“Jewish humanism” (Derrida, “The Mystical”
22).
In a way, Levinas’s ethical and religious
philosophy is the strongest possible manifestation of humanism: it is a faith in humanism that
relies on no other higher principle or essence
that would be the reason for human value.
Prior to ontology is responsibility, but not an
abstract idea of responsibility or a noumenal
principle of responsibility. Ethics is not a
metaphysical substance that imposes itself
prior to all things in the fashion of a Genesis.
Instead, ethics as first philosophy is the placement of human fraternity before all ontology,

PHILOSOPHY TODAY
434

© Depaul University 2006

commonality, sharing, or knowing. Human
fraternity is itself, for Levinas, responsibility
for the other (Otherwise 116). This is what being human means, it means being responsible
without any ontology or essence that would
ground this responsibility. Thus, one need
know nothing, learn nothing, and remember
nothing in order to be human. “We are human,”
Levinas writes, “before being learned and remain so after having forgotten much” (Outside
3).
Thus, for Levinas, the only esse of the human is responsibility, and this essence precedes all ontological characteristics. Responsibility is prior even to consciousness or being,
but is the hallmark of the human being. By locating the origin and meaning of human as
pre-ontological, Levinas establishes a radical
humanism, more human than all the ontological notions of human essence. His faith in the
human can be so absolute because it is at once
also his face in God, his hanging on to what he
calls “the goodness of everyday life” that remains after every failure to organize the human
in thought, theory, principle, science, or philosophy (Alterity 107). Goodness, God, responsibility, in distinctively Levinasian
pre-ontological registers, are what define the
human, separate the human from all those
things that are merely persistent substance in
the world, things that truly are first being before they are involved in ethics and which become involved in ethics only by virtue first of
the human as the prototype of the ethical relation. No matter how many horrors, atrocities,
abominations, and evils man lets loose upon
the world, Levinas insists that “poor kindness
holds on. It is a ‘mad goodness,’ the most human thing there is in man. It defines man”
(Alterity 109).
This is what Levinas will call a humanism
of the Other. It binds human to human pre-on-

tologically, before there is any notion or idea or
thought that would make the idea of human intelligible or capable of articulation. This is a
humanism that is more human, more grounded
in the notion of an intrinsic, unshakable goodness and responsibility in the human, than all
those notions of humanism that would locate
in the species some essence that would then be
the intermediary to valuation and ethics. In
many ways, this refiguring of humanism is the
very core of Levinas’s philosophy and the end
of his articulation. Attention to the Other, at
once and the same time this human standing
before me now and God, has consistently
across his work been “the very bond of human
subjectivity, even to the point of being raised to
a supreme ethical principle” (“Useless
Suffering” 159). What could be more
humanist than this?
Levinas can break with the tradition of humanism for all those failings that most anti-humanists have so rightly pointed out and at the
same moment lay claim to a humanism far
more human in its absolute faith and valuation
of the human because he will remove the operation of a mediating substantive essence such
as logic or language that imbues the human
with value. Instead, his humanism of the Other
places value itself, responsibility, ethics, God,
goodness, however one wishes to term it, as innately and uniquely human, before all ontological structures or essences that will (always
failingly) try to organize or account for that
mad goodness. Thus, Levinas is more than
consistent to be skeptical about the face of the
dog or the snake and to claim that all ethical responsibilities for the non-human other emerge
only as resultant of the uniquely human ethics
that is before all being.
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